

## ATHENS AND AMORGES

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### I

IN HIS SPEECH *On the Peace*, delivered in the winter of 392/1, Andocides charges the Athenians with habitually choosing to discard stronger friends and to ally with weaker ones (3.28). He seeks to substantiate his criticism by referring to three occasions towards the end of the fifth century when, in his opinion, their observance of this practice proved disastrous to their interests (29–31). His first example (29), which alone will be examined in detail here, is their decision to abrogate the treaty of eternal friendship with Persia negotiated by his uncle Epilycus and to accept the overtures of the rebel Amorges. He claims that by preferring the friendship of Amorges, whom he describes as a slave and a fugitive, they so angered the Persian king that he allied with the Spartans and provided them with 5000 talents in war subsidies,<sup>1</sup> thus enabling them to destroy the power of Athens. Some modern scholars have accepted in its entirety the case against the Athenians presented in this passage and have concluded that they were guilty of inexcusable recklessness in provoking Persian reprisals.<sup>2</sup> Although the notion that the Athenians tended to prefer weaker to stronger friends seems to have become a rhetorical commonplace in the fourth century,<sup>3</sup> Andocides is alone in citing their friendship with Amorges as an example. Because the Attic orators are notorious for the untrustworthiness of their references to

<sup>1</sup>This figure is also given by Isocrates (8.97) and may well be a traditionally accepted estimate.

The following will be cited by author's name: A. Andrewes, *Historia* 10 (1961) 1–18; K. J. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte* 2.1 (1914); K. J. Dover, *Greek Popular Morality* (Oxford 1974); R. Meiggs and D. M. Lewis, *Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions* (Oxford 1969); E. Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums* 4 (Stuttgart 1901); H. T. Wade-Gery, *Essays in Greek History* (Oxford 1958).

<sup>2</sup>G. Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte* 3.2 (Gotha 1901) 1417, maintains that the Athenians "waren leichtsinnig genug Persien zu reizen"; Wade-Gery, 223, that their action "was gambling very high." Meyer, 524–525, though less critical of Athens for supporting Amorges, accepts the claim of Andocides that this decision was the principal reason for the renewal of war with Persia.

<sup>3</sup>Dem. 20.3, cf. Isocr. 4.52–53, who claims that this widespread criticism of the Athenians is undeserved, being based upon misinterpretation of their commendable proneness to champion the weak and oppressed. The latter notion is another rhetorical commonplace, cf. Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.45; Dem. 15.22. Plato *Menex.* 244e, often cited as criticism, is ambiguous.

past events and of their interpretations of these events,<sup>4</sup> the validity of the charge brought against the Athenians by Andocides is not necessarily to be regarded as incontestable unless endorsed by other considerations. The passage raises an issue much wider and more important than that of his standing as a historical authority. His criticism, if valid, lends support to the belief, widely held in antiquity and in modern times, that the Athenian democracy, especially in the last quarter of the fifth century, was inclined to act rashly and irresponsibly.

The only other ancient author who provides evidence on Athenian relations with Amorges is Thucydides. His rather brief references to Amorges are the following:

- 1 (8.5.4–5) When Tissaphernes sends an envoy to Sparta in the winter of 413/12 to offer financial support for a Peloponnesian offensive against the Athenians in Asia, one of his motives is "to bring alive or to kill, as the King had instructed him, Amorges, bastard son of Pissuthnes, who had revolted in Caria."
- 2 (8.19.1–2) Soon after the first revolts in Asia, when a Chian squadron is at Anaea, apparently intending to sail on to Miletus, Chalcideus, the Spartan commander, sends a message that it must return home and that Amorges is about to arrive by land with an army.<sup>5</sup>
- 3 (8.28.2–4) In the late summer of 412 Tissaphernes persuades the Peloponnesians to launch an attack by sea on Iasus, the headquarters of Amorges and his mercenary army. Complete surprise is achieved, since the approaching ships are mistakenly believed to be Athenian. The city falls at the first assault, and the Peloponnesians after sacking it hand it over to Tissaphernes together with Amorges, whom they have captured alive.
- 4 (8.54.3) When in the following winter Peisander is planning the establishment of an oligarchy, he secures the dismissal of Phrynichus by accusing him of having betrayed Iasus and Amorges. Thucydides regards the charge as a calumny, the real motive of Peisander being to remove an enemy of Alcibiades.<sup>6</sup>

On one important point the third of these Thucydidean passages does confirm, if somewhat obliquely, the version of Andocides. The fatal error of the rebels at Iasus in identifying the ships entering their harbour presupposes that the Athenians would have been welcomed there and

<sup>4</sup>L. Pearson, *CP* 36 (1941) 210–211, Dover 11–13.

<sup>5</sup>According to S. Van de Maele, *Phoenix* 25 (1971) 37 n. 19, καὶ ὅτι 'Αμόργης παρέσται κατὰ γῆν στρατιᾷ, gives a second reason, which is distinct from the order sent by Chalcideus, why the Chian fleet turned back, but the verb παρέσται shows that the clause must be part of his message. Steup, *ad loc.* and *Anhang* 283–284, suggests a lacuna before καὶ ὅτι containing a warning about the Athenian ships blockading Miletus; it is among the more plausible of his many lacunae. Meyer, 563, infers, perhaps rightly, that Amorges was attempting to prevent the Peloponnesians from gaining control of Miletus.

<sup>6</sup>As I suggested in *JHS* 76 (1956) 101 n. 15, the sole basis of this charge seems to have been that Phrynichus had been responsible for the Athenian withdrawal from Milesian territory (8.27.1–5), which left the enemy free to attack Iasus. (Hereafter references are to Thucydides unless otherwise stated.)

The name of Amorges is among those recognised in the as yet undeciphered Lycian text of the Xanthian Stele, cf. P. Demargne and H. Metzger, *RE* 9A 2 (1967) 1386.

were probably expected to arrive, as their fleet had been operating off Miletus (8.25–27). Thucydides does therefore vouch for co-operation between Athens and Amorges, at any rate shortly before the fall of Iasus, and the fourth passage presupposes that the elimination of Amorges was damaging to Athenian interests. On the other hand, when he mentions the offer made by Tissaphernes to the Spartans, he gives no intimation of the state of Athenian relations either with Persia or with Amorges at that time. Nor does he indicate anywhere when or why the association between Athens and Amorges began. Thus he does not expressly confirm, though neither does he expressly deny, the contention of Andocides that, when the Athenians accepted overtures from Amorges, they still enjoyed Persian goodwill and could have continued to enjoy it if they had not misguidedly chosen to support a Persian rebel. In seeking to determine whether or not this contention is well-founded the next step must be to examine some other evidence relating to the situation in Asia and to Athenian contacts with that area in the period preceding the Ionian war, since this evidence has been deemed to throw some light upon the problem under discussion.

## II

The revolt of Amorges was preceded by a revolt by his father Pissuthnes, who had been satrap at Sardis for many years. The connection, if any, between the two revolts is obscure, since that of Pissuthnes is known only from the epitome of Ctesias' *Persica* (52), which contains no reference to Amorges. The chronology is equally obscure: there is no evidence attesting, even approximately, when the revolt of Pissuthnes began or ended or when that of Amorges began. Largely because the death of a Persian king often led to rebellions in the provinces, the revolt of Pissuthnes is widely believed to have occurred not long after the death of Artaxerxes in 424. Tissaphernes, who was sent down with two other Persian nobles, probably soon after 420, to suppress the revolt, finally succeeded, perhaps a year or two later, by bribing the Greek mercenaries of Pissuthnes to betray him and was appropriately rewarded by being appointed to the satrapy at Sardis.<sup>7</sup> It is relevant to the present investigation that the Athenians evidently lent no support, official or unofficial, to Pissuthnes, even though their hands were relatively free during the probable period of his rebellion.<sup>8</sup> Some scholars assume, not unreasonably, that

<sup>7</sup>Cf. H. Schaefer, *RE* 20.2 (1950) 1809; O. Murray, *Historia* 15 (1966) 148. W. W. Tarn, *CAH* 6 (1927) 3, gives 413 as the year of his appointment without any explanation of this dating.

<sup>8</sup>Wade-Gery, 222, seems to believe that the Athenians supported Pissuthnes unofficially, because the commander of the Greek mercenaries was an Athenian named

Amorges continued the revolt of his father (Beloch 377, Wade-Gery 222). This view, however, does not receive any support from the meagre and scattered evidence, which seems rather to present the two revolts as separate episodes. The epitome of Ctesias, *Persica*, gives the impression that with the betrayal of Pissuthnes and the appointment of Tissaphernes as satrap Persian authority in Asia Minor was restored, while neither Andocides nor Thucydides when referring to the revolt of Amorges mentions that of his father.<sup>9</sup> Although both rebel leaders employed Greek mercenaries, Amorges can hardly have taken over the army of Pissuthnes, since Tissaphernes, after bribing these Greeks to desert, is unlikely to have allowed them to drift away and offer their services to his son.<sup>10</sup> Amorges thus seems to have enlisted his mercenaries independently, doubtless when planning his revolt. His Greeks are known to have been mainly Peloponnesians (8.28.4), who can hardly have been recruited after, or even some months before, the resumption of open war in Greece in the early spring of 413. Apart from this probable *terminus ante quem*, there appears to be no shred of evidence which can help to date the beginning of his revolt. It seems impossible to establish even an approximate *terminus post quem*, and Iasus was not necessarily his headquarters at the outset, as it was later.

Amorges may have revolted some considerable time, though possibly not more than two or three years, before the Persians initiated negotiations with the Peloponnesians in the winter of 413/12 (8.5.5). There is, however, no indication, apart from the implication by Andocides in his charge against Athens discussed above (319), that at the time of these negotiations at Sparta the Athenians had yet concluded an agreement with Amorges or indeed that there had been any breach of the treaty of Epilycus by either side. It is true that an inscription recording a payment in March 414 to an Athenian *strategos* ἐν Ἐφ[—, which must surely be Ephesus (Meiggs & Lewis, no. 77, line 79), has been cited as evidence of Athenian co-operation with Amorges at that date,<sup>11</sup> but this conclusion

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Lycon. Andrewes, 4 with n. 10, rightly points out that the Athenian origin of this commander provides no indication of the attitude of the Athenian state. It was already an established practice for Greek mercenaries to be employed by Persians, cf. H. W. Parke, *Greek Mercenary Soldiers* (Oxford 1933) 14–15, 23. Lycon may well have been an exile. Many years earlier Pissuthnes had more than once shown hostility towards Athens (Thuc. 1.115.4; 3.31.1, 34.2).

<sup>9</sup>If Amorges held aloof from the revolt of his father, he may have fancied his chances of being appointed satrap at Sardis and have rebelled when the appointment of Tissaphernes dashed his hopes. His illegitimacy was no bar to preferment: Darius himself was a bastard.

<sup>10</sup>Lycon, their commander, was rewarded with "cities and estates" (Ctes. *Pers.* 52), which presumably relieved him of the need to earn his living.

<sup>11</sup>Wade-Gery, 222–223, seems to have been the first to interpret the passage of the

is by no means cogent. There are all manner of reasons why the Athenians might have sent a mission to Ephesus in 414. Had its purpose been military collaboration with Amorges, it might have been expected to have been sent to Iasus, if indeed he was already installed there, or to Miletus, which is much closer than Ephesus to Iasus. A more probable explanation is that the *strategos* was sent because the Athenians had reason to suspect the loyalty of Ephesus,<sup>12</sup> which, as will be noted below, was evidently in revolt in 412 (8.19.3). Another possible explanation of this mission is that its purpose, like those of 430 (2.69), 428 (3.19), and 425/4 (4.50.1; 75.1), was to collect arrears of tribute by a show of force. In 414 the Athenians, largely because of the expedition to Sicily, were suffering from financial stringency, which soon afterwards caused them to alter their system of taxation (7.28.4).

It will be convenient to consider at this point another hypothesis relating to Ephesus which, if accepted, would throw some light on the validity of the charge that the Athenians acted recklessly in concluding an agreement with Amorges. Scholars have suggested that Ephesus, unlike other Ionian cities, was lost to Athens and fell under the control of Tissaphernes before the Athenian disaster in Sicily.<sup>13</sup> Although a member of the Confederacy, Ephesus was apparently disposed to be disloyal during the Archidamian war: an Ephesian contribution to a Spartan war fund is attested by an inscription generally dated about 427 (Meiggs & Lewis, no. 67, lines 22–23), and in that year the Spartan admiral Alcidas called there with his Peloponnesian fleet (3.32.2–33.1). The city was, however, controlled by Athens in March 414, as is shown by the inscription discussed in the preceding paragraph.<sup>14</sup> The reason why Ephesus is believed to have been lost to Athens at some time before the disaster in Sicily prompted widespread disaffection appears to be that, whereas Thucydides mentions an incident in the summer of 412 when a Peloponnesian ship pursued by the Athenians found refuge there (8.19.3), he does not include Ephesus among the allied cities which revolted in the course of the same summer. Hence it is thought to have revolted before disaffected allies began to compete for Spartan aid in the winter of 413/12 (8.5–6), and

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inscription in this way (he also suggests, more convincingly, that the *strategos* was at Ephesus to prevent Tissaphernes collecting tribute). Others consider this interpretation to be a possibility, though they are very guarded, cf. *ATL* 3 (1950) 356; Andrewes, 5.

<sup>12</sup>B. D. Meritt, *Hesperia* 5 (1936) 382, cf. *ATL* loc. cit.

<sup>13</sup>U. von Wilamowitz, *Hermes* 43 (1908) 587; Beloch, 377; C. Picard, *Ephèse et Claros* (Paris 1922) 609–610; cf. the account of Ephesian history in this period by L. Bürchner, *RE* 5 (1905) 2789–2790, which is conspicuously inaccurate.

<sup>14</sup>This inscription was not known to Beloch, 377, who cites evidence that in 416 Ephesus was still loyal to Athens. According to *ATL* 2 (1949) 80, the city paid tribute in 415/4, as indeed did Iasus (*ibid.*).

Thucydides is believed to have omitted to mention this revolt because his account of the period in which it occurred is almost exclusively devoted to the campaign in Sicily and virtually ignores events in the Aegean area. This argument is unconvincing. Thucydides does not refer specifically to every revolt in 412, even those of sizable cities: he records that Phocaea and Cyme sheltered Peloponnesian ships scattered by a storm (8.31.3), but he has not previously mentioned the revolt of either city, though there is every reason to believe that both revolted in 412 and not earlier.<sup>15</sup> If Ephesus had fallen into the hands of Tissaphernes, either by invitation of its inhabitants or by force, before other Ionian cities had begun to take steps in the direction of revolt, the Athenians would have had some justification for believing that Persia had broken the peace of Epilycus and that to ally with a Persian rebel would be both legitimate and expedient. There is, however, no reason to believe that Ephesus was lost to Athens until the summer of 412, when the arrival of Chalcideus and Alcibiades at Chios and the eagerness and enterprise of the Chians encouraged many Ionian cities to renounce their allegiance to Athens.<sup>16</sup>

Another scrap of evidence which may be thought relevant to the problem of relations between Athens and Amorges is provided by Aristophanes. In the *Birds* (1028–1030),<sup>17</sup> produced at the City Dionysia early in 414, he mentions Pharnaces, the satrap at Dascylium and father of the more celebrated Pharnabazus, who in the winter of 413/12 had already inherited the satrapy (8.6.1–2). In this passage the self-important Inspector claims to be conducting business of some kind with Pharnaces on behalf of Athens. Aristophanes thereby introduces a favourite dogma, namely that negotiations with orientals brought no benefit to the Athenian state and were exploited by charlatans in pursuit of personal gain. If an agreement with Amorges had already been made or was being negotiated, a reference to diplomatic contacts, even though imaginary,<sup>18</sup> with another leading Persian, who was loyal to the King, would have seemed singularly tactless to members of the audience who were knowledgeable about the

<sup>15</sup>A passage in which a force of Peloponnesian and local troops is stated to have been marching "towards Clazomenae and Cyme" (8.22.1) perhaps suggests that Cyme was at that time already in revolt, since Clazomenae undoubtedly was (14.3). The narrative of Thucydides is hereabouts surprisingly inexplicit (see below, 327).

<sup>16</sup>Like other rebel Ionians, the Ephesians began to issue coins on the Chian standard, cf. C. T. Seltman, *Greek Coins*<sup>2</sup> (London 1955) 148; but there is no means of determining when the issue of these coins began. From 410 Ephesus, where Persian influence was exceptionally strong, is seen to have been firmly controlled by Tissaphernes, cf. 8.109; Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.6.

<sup>17</sup>Andrewes, 5, has drawn attention to this passage but does not set much store by it.

<sup>18</sup>R. Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire* (Oxford 1972) 586, apparently interprets the passage as evidence of real negotiations with Pharnaces. This interpretation, if accepted, could be used as an argument against the existence of an Athenian agreement with a rebel leader in an adjacent satrapy, but it seems unlikely.

current state of relations with Persia. Such members, however, were probably few at a time when all eyes were turned towards the west, and Aristophanes perhaps chose the name Pharnaces because it would be easily recognised by the whole audience as that of a Persian grandee with whom a pretentious bureaucrat might claim to be negotiating.

### III

It must be acknowledged that the evidence which has been discussed in the preceding section is largely negative. It does not make any very significant contribution to the crucial question whether, when the Athenians concluded an agreement with Amorges, they were still on friendly terms with Persia and thus deliberately forfeited Persian goodwill. Accordingly, the evidence of Andocides and Thucydides must be examined more closely, and an attempt must be made to assess its value and implications.

The speech of Andocides *On the Peace* is conspicuous, even among those of Attic orators, for its inaccuracies, which very probably include deliberate distortions. In a long passage near the beginning (3.3–9) he tries to prove, by referring to several occasions in the fifth century, that the conclusion of peace with Sparta had always benefited Athens and had never endangered the democracy. The passage is full of errors, as modern scholars have pointed out.<sup>19</sup> When he later criticises the Athenians for preferring weaker to stronger friends (28), his second example (30), which follows the passage about Amorges, charges them with having rejected an offer of friendship and alliance made by a Syracusan embassy: instead of accepting the powerful Syracusans as friends, they chose Segesta and Catana and so embarked upon their disastrous expedition to Sicily. The story of this embassy, which is not recorded elsewhere, is almost certainly apocryphal.<sup>20</sup> The Syracusans had persistently suspected Athens of imperialistic ambitions in the west and had vigorously opposed any threat of interference. Their alleged offer of friendship, though possibly invented by some predecessor of Andocides, is more probably a fabrication of his own designed to strengthen his plea for peace.

In his criticism of Athenian policy in relation to Persia and to Amorges (29) the separate facts recorded by Andocides seem to be authentic enough: the treaty of Epilycus,<sup>21</sup> Athenian co-operation with Amorges, the Persian alliance with Sparta, the payment of Persian subsidies and its disastrous effects upon Athens. On the other hand, his conclusions

<sup>19</sup>From R. C. Jebb, *Attic Orators*<sup>2</sup> 1 (London 1893) 127–129 to U. Albin, *Andocide, De Pace* (Florence 1964) 17.

<sup>20</sup>Andrewes, 3; Albin, *op. cit.* 19 with n. *ad loc.*; Dover, 11–12.

<sup>21</sup>Wade-Gery, 207–211; Meiggs, (above, n. 18) 134–135.

derived from these facts are by no means above suspicion, and there is reason to believe that he is guilty of trying to deceive his audience. His demonstrable unscrupulousness in dealing with fifth-century events, together with implications in the references by Thucydides to the same situation which will be considered below, suggests that he has adopted a form of chicanery practised by other orators seeking also to convict the Athenians of reckless folly in the past, namely distortion of the chronology. Isocrates (8.84–85) almost certainly and Aeschines (2.76) without any doubt accuse the Athenians of having launched their expedition to Sicily at a time when the Spartans had already fortified Decelea. In defence of Isocrates it might be argued that he has in mind the reinforcement under Demosthenes which left for Sicily after the fortification of Decelea had begun (7.19.1–3; 20). From the context, however, there is surely no doubt that he is referring to the initial expeditionary force, which sailed almost two years earlier.<sup>22</sup> Aeschines, searching for examples of blunders by fifth-century Athenians which must be avoided by his contemporaries, is more blatantly guilty of alleging that the expedition to Sicily was sent out after the fortification of Decelea (Dover 11). Because these two major events are securely dated by irreproachable evidence from other sources, the conclusion is beyond dispute that he has reversed their order, possibly misled by informants,<sup>23</sup> but far more probably with deliberate intent. Where Andocides directs similar strictures against the Athenians because of their policy relating to Persia and to Amorges, the circumstances are very much less well attested. Accordingly, while he may be justifiably suspected of having distorted the chronology by maintaining that the Athenians were still on good terms with Persia when they decided to support Amorges, he is perhaps fortunate that the case against him cannot be established beyond all possible doubt.

The brevity of Thucydides in referring to Amorges is to a large extent consistent with his practice of confining his attention to essentials. Because Amorges was crushed so soon after the outbreak of the Ionian war, his influence upon its development, which might have been considerable if he had remained a thorn in the flesh of Tissaphernes, was in

<sup>22</sup>He maintains that the expedition was directed "against those who had never done us any injustice" (84). M. L. W. Laistner, *Isocrates, De Pace and Philippus* (New York 1927) n. on 8.84 (cf. 24–25), is much too charitable in "assuming a certain looseness of expression on the part of Isocrates." G. Mathieu, *Isocrate, Discours 3* (Budé, Paris 1942) n. on 8.85, is far more convincing when he declares that Isocrates is taking liberties with the chronology; he points out that the conquests of Italy, Sicily, and Carthage to which Isocrates refers (85) were envisaged before the first expedition.

<sup>23</sup>He claims to have been informed by his father and an uncle about at least some of the fifth-century misfortunes to which he refers (2.78), but his real aim in naming these relatives is evidently to draw attention to their public services.



fact almost negligible.<sup>24</sup> Some surprise may perhaps be felt that the existence of an understanding between Athens and Amorges emerges indirectly, as has been noted above (320), from a reference to the error committed by the defenders of Iasus in believing that approaching Peloponnesian ships were Athenian (8.28.2). In this part of the eighth book, however, the narrative is somewhat lacking in completeness and precision, at any rate where Alcibiades is not personally involved.<sup>25</sup> Attention has already been drawn to the absence of specific references to every revolt by members of the Confederacy (324), and information on numbers and movements of ships tends to be defective or inconsistent, as many editors have pointed out.<sup>26</sup>

One aspect of relations between the Athenians and Amorges might have been expected to have aroused the interest of Thucydides if indeed, when already engaged on a major offensive in Sicily, they chose to sacrifice the advantages of their treaty with Persia by supporting a rebel and thereby provoking Persian reprisals. Thucydides would surely have ranked this decision among the errors of judgement whereby, in his opinion, through abandoning the advice of Pericles, they brought upon themselves their ultimate defeat (2.65.7–13). His verdicts on their actions, and those of others, are less often explicitly stated than conveyed by implication, as in the case of their refusal to accept Spartan overtures during the Pylos episode.<sup>27</sup> Yet, neither explicitly nor indirectly, neither in the eighth book nor elsewhere in the *History*, does he criticise them for a decision which, if Andocides is to be believed, was responsible for the fatal alliance between Persia and Sparta. Admittedly there are some strange omissions from the *History*, but it is among the most prominent convictions of Thucydides that the post-Periclean democracy, misled by inferior leaders, was inclined to make disastrous blunders arising from overconfidence. Here, on the other hand, he notes that the disaster in Sicily had a sobering effect upon the democracy (8.1.4).

Finally, the passage recording the orders issued by Darius to Tissaphernes and his reaction to them (8.5.4–5) is intended to explain why a

<sup>24</sup>A. G. Woodhead, *Thucydides and the Nature of Power* (Harvard 1970) 148, whose treatment of the revolts of Pisuthnes and Amorges (146–148) seems to me to be convincing, except that he dates the success of Tissaphernes against Pisuthnes as late as 413 (146). I am fortunate in having been able to consult him on this point. He tells me that he would be willing to accept 414 or even 415 as a date for the suppression of Pisuthnes; but he is inclined to see the revolt of Pisuthnes and his son as one continuous event, in which the suppression of the former was an important but not decisive element.

<sup>25</sup>Thucydides is unusually well-informed about Spartan policy at this time where Alcibiades was involved in the making of it (8.5–12).

<sup>26</sup>Cf. the notes on 26.1, 30, and 33.1 by Steup and by R. Weil (Budé).

<sup>27</sup>Cf. my *Individuals in Thucydides* (Cambridge 1968) 65–69.

representative of Persia accompanied the missions from Chios and Erythrae to Sparta. It is not, most unfortunately, intended to present a picture of relations between Athens and Persia at the time. Tissaphernes had recently received a demand from the Great King for the payment of tribute, οὓς δι' Ἀθηναίους ἀπὸ τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων οὐ δυνάμενος πράσσειν ἐπωφείλησεν · τοὺς τε οὖν φόρους μᾶλλον ἐνόμιζε κομίζειν κακῶσας τοὺς Ἀθηναίους. The evidence of Thucydides, here and elsewhere, if considered in isolation, suggests that the Persian attitude towards Athens and the Athenian attitude towards Persia were at the time as follows. Hitherto the Persians, though never renouncing their claim to tribute from Greek cities, had been unable to exact it because of Athenian naval power. Accordingly, they refrained from coercive measures which might provoke Athenian reactions.<sup>28</sup> The situation was then transformed, in Asia as elsewhere, by the disaster in Sicily: Athens appeared to have been irretrievably ruined and was not expected to survive throughout the following summer (8.2). It may well have been news of this disaster that prompted Darius to send his demand to Tissaphernes.<sup>29</sup> Certainly Tissaphernes believed that he could best meet this demand by "weakening the Athenians" (κακῶσας τοὺς Ἀθηναίους), who now seemed no longer formidable. His aims, including the crushing of Amorges, would be more easily achieved if the Peloponnesians consented to intervene in Asia. It is not clear from the account of Thucydides whether either Persia or Athens considered that a formal treaty existed with the other, but in the new situation neither Darius nor Tissaphernes can have seen any reason to submit to any constraint upon Persian freedom of action in Asia Minor. To turn to the attitude of the Athenians, news began to reach them in the spring of 412 that the Chians were preparing to revolt (8.9.2). At the same time they doubtless got wind of the offer made by Tissaphernes to their enemies and realised that he intended to exploit their weakness so as to restore Persian control over the Asiatic Greek cities. They may have already been approached by Amorges,<sup>30</sup> but it is unlikely that any agreement had been concluded when Tissaphernes sent his envoy to Sparta in the winter of 413/12: Thucydides might have been expected to have included a reference to it in his account of the reasons why Tissaphernes made his offer of financial aid.<sup>31</sup> In the following spring, however, when the Athenians knew that

<sup>28</sup>In the passage quoted above the use of the phrase δι' Ἀθηναίους (not ὑπ' Ἀθηναίων) suggests that the existence of the Athenian navy was sufficient deterrent without armed intervention.

<sup>29</sup>Cf. Steup, n. on 8.5.5. The demand was recent (νεωστί) in the winter of 413/12.

<sup>30</sup>It is reasonable to accept the statement of Andocides (3.29, Ἀμόργῃ πειθόμενοι) that the initiative came from Amorges, since, if the opposite had been the case, he could have used this factor to strengthen his charge against the Athenians.

<sup>31</sup>Whereas Thucydides states that Tissaphernes was unable to exact tribute from

Tissaphernes was plotting against them, they had nothing to lose by making a pact with a Persian rebel. They might indeed hope to secure considerable benefits, since Amorges possessed a mercenary army which was probably the strongest military force in Asia Minor at the time. The sudden fall of Iasus must have been a bitter blow.<sup>32</sup>

The evidence of Thucydides, though not so full or so explicit as could have been wished, suggests that Andocides, seeking to provide himself with an example of Athenian foolhardiness, is almost certainly guilty of falsification. The Athenians did not deliberately sacrifice Persian goodwill. On the contrary, the Persians deliberately sacrificed Athenian goodwill, believing that their own interests would now best be served by supporting the enemies of Athens, namely the Peloponnesians and rebellious Athenian allies. In the desperate situation in which the Athenians found themselves their decision to co-operate with Amorges was not foolhardy but perfectly reasonable.<sup>33</sup>

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Greek Asia because of the Athenians, nothing is said of any influence by them upon the commitment imposed upon Tissaphernes to suppress the revolt of Amorges.

<sup>32</sup>Professor J. M. Cook has kindly informed me that the imposing but apparently unfinished fortifications on the landward side of the city, which he and G. E. Bean, in *BSA* 52 (1957) 104–105, were inclined to attribute to Amorges, must be assigned to a later period; cf. F. E. Winter, *Greek Fortifications* (London 1971) 241–243.

<sup>33</sup>I am most grateful to Mr J. A. Crook who has made helpful comments on this paper.